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IN UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALBERT CRAMER,
Appellant/Petitioner,
Case No. 20050701-CA
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Respondent.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF T H E PROCEEDINGS
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(j) (West 2004). Cramer
appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child, both first-degree felonies (R. 536-37). He appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court, the supreme court poured the case over to this Court.
ISSUE STATEMENTS AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. May Cramer raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time
in post-conviction even though he could have, but did not raise those claims on direct appeal?
2. Did Cramer prove that his appellate counsel were ineffective because they did not
seek reversal based on his failure to testify at trial?
3. Did Cramer prove prejudice from his appellate counsel's failure to supplement the
direct-appeal record with his victim's mental health records where he did not include those

records in the post-conviction proceedings, no record exists of what those records contain, and
the trial court previously reviewed them and concluded that they contained no evidence material
to Cramer's defense?
4. Did Cramer prove that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge trial
counsel's investigation and use of witnesses and documents?
5. Did Cramer prove cumulative prejudice where the case that he claims his trial counsel
should have presented would have resulted in the jury learning that he previously pleaded guilty
to two counts of lewdness with two other young boys under circumstances similar to those
which the victim in this case described?
This Court reviews the post-conviction court's legal conclusions for correctness and
factual findings for clear error. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U.S.
966 (1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-105 and 106 (West 2004) are attached as
addendum A.
CASE STATEMENT 1
CRIMINAL CASE
Cramer applied to become a court appointed special advocate ("CASA") to assist the
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem in working with abused or neglected children who have

Cramer's fact and case statements contain several legal assertions. For example, he
repeatedly avers that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The State will address
only the legal arguments contained in Cramer's Argument section.
2

pending juvenile court proceedings. A CASA volunteer is assigned to contact a child and report
to the guardian ad litem ("GAL") on the child's general welfare, school progress, and other
"basic factual information." (R. 724 at 121-25, 126.)
Cramer believed he had "special expertise" in dealing with young boys because he
worked for the Boy Scouts of America. Cramer requested an assignment as a CASA for young
boys. (Id at 124-25.)
On October 21,1996, Cramer was assigned as M.L.'s CASA. M.L. was seven years-old
and was in residential treatment at the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute ("UNI").
(Id. at 159, 125, 128-29.)
As a CASA volunteer, Cramer was expected to contact M.L. at least four times a month,
twice in person and twice by phone. As required by CASA procedures, Cramer kept a log of
visits and activities with M.L. According to Cramer's logs, he sometimes saw M.L. four or five
days in a row and on some of those days more than once. Cramer spent "an extraordinary
amount of time" with M.L., compared to the amount of time other CASA volunteers spend with
their charges. (Id at 125-38.)
Cramer recorded that, among other things, he hugged and tickled M.L., tucked him into
bed, and told M.L. that he was M.L.'s "special friend," and "like his dad." In addition to various
other activities, Cramer recorded that he took M.L. swimming at least six times. Cramer
reported in his log that, after one of the swimming excursions, he and M.L. discussed the
anatomical differences between boys and girls. (Id. at 129,131-32,134-36,138.)
In January 1997, while still in residential treatment at UNI, M.L. first met his future
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adoptive parents. M.L. began living with his adoptive parents in March 1997. (Id. at 149-50.)
Cramer twice visited M.L. after M.L. began living with his adoptive parents. During the
second visit, Cramer again took M.L. swimming. (Id. at 151-53.)
The night following Cramer's second visit, and for the first time since he had been living
with his adoptive parents, M.L. wet his bed and continued to do so three to four times a week
over a one-month period. M.L. also began masturbating. (Id. at 152-53, 155, 160.)
On August 8,1997, M.L.'s adoptive mother brought M.L. to the Children's Justice Center
in Salt Lake City because she had "a feeling . . . that something wasn't right." Detective Alex
Huggard of the Murray City Police Department interviewed M.L. During that interview and on
direct questioning, M.L. denied that Cramer had sexually abused him. (Id. at 155, 160, 163; R.
725 at 238-39.)
In early March 1998, M.L. had been living with his adoptive family for a year. Based on
his adoptive father's assurances that everything would be fine, M.L. disclosed to his parents that
Cramer sexually abused him. (EL 724 at 149-50; R. 725 at 157,197-98.)
On March 6,1998, Detective Huggard interviewed M.L. a second time. M.L. stated that
Cramer had touched M.L.'s "front" and "back" "private parts." M.L. denied that Cramer had
ever inserted his finger into M.L.'s rectum or ever touched M.L.'s "private parts" at UNI. (R.
724 at 164; R. 725 at 240-41, 244-45.)
At trial, M.L. testified that Cramer would visit him at UNI and take him out to swim, eat,
and visit parks. He testified that he liked going places with Cramer, he liked it when Cramer
visited him at UNI, and he generally liked Cramer at that time. (R. 725 at 182-83, 186.)

4

M.L. testified that Cramer had touched him in ways that made him feel "uncomfortable."
For example, M.L. testified that Cramer rubbed and pinched his buttocks both under and on top
of M.L.'s clothes. M.L. testified that Cramer touched M.L.'s penis, both under and over M.L.'s
clothing. M.L. testified that Cramer would grab and rub M.L.'s penis forcefully while asking
M.L. if it felt good. M.L. testified that "it hurt." M.L. also testified that Cramer frequently
pinched M.L.'s breasts. (Id. at 186-87,189-90, 192-94.)
M.L. testified that Cramer touched M.L.'s "private parts" "a whole bunch." He testified
that Cramer did this at the swimming pools and in the dressing rooms while the two were
changing together. M.L. testified that he and Cramer "went to the swimming pool a lot." (Id.
at 190, 192, 194-95.)2
M.L. explained that he did not reveal Cramer's abuse during the first interview because
he was afraid and believed that if he disclosed Cramer's abuse, he (M.L.) would "be in trouble."
M.L. finally decided to tell his adoptive parents that Cramer had sexually abused him because
they told him "that everything would be fine and [he] believed cem." (Id. at 197-98.)
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") attorneys Kim Clark and John O'Connell,
Jr., represented Cramer at trial. They called only Detective Huggard. Through Detective
Huggard, and using his interview transcripts, defense counsel highlighted inconsistencies in
M.L.'s accounts of Cramer's abuse. Defense counsel elicited evidence that, in the first interview,
M.L. denied that Cramer had ever touched him inappropriately, and that, based on M.L.'s

2

M.L. also testified that Cramer touched him in ways that were "okay." For example,
M.L. testified that Cramer would pat him on the back, run his hands through his hair, give
him hugs, and tuck him in at night at UNI. (R. 725 at 195.)
5

assurances, Detective Huggard closed the case. They elicited evidence that, although M.L.
testified that Cramer pinched him, that the touching hurt, and that Cramer had asked him if it
felt good, M.L. never reported those details to Huggard, instead reporting only that Cramer had
touched his "front private" and his "back private." Detective Huggard also acknowledged that,
although M.L. testified that he could only remember Cramer touching him in the swimming
pools and locker rooms, M.L. reported to him that Cramer inappropriately touched him while
the two were in Cramer's car. (R. 724 at 2; R. 725 at 193, 228-54, 270-77.)
Defense counsel also cross-examined M.L. and emphasized inconsistencies between
M.L.'s preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony. They demonstrated that M.L.
testified at the preliminary hearing that Cramer only touched him inappropriately in the locker
rooms, but testified at trial that Cramer touched him both in the locker rooms and the swimming
pools. Trial Tr. at 203-04. They demonstrated that his preliminary hearing testimony included
no accusation that Cramer pinched his buttocks in addition to rubbing it. Trial Tr. at 208. They
demonstrated that, at the preliminary hearing, M.L. testified only that he "didn't know" why he
did not disclose the abuse, in contradistinction to his trial testimony that he was afraid to do so.
(R. 725 at 203-204, 208, 210-11).
In addition to cross-examining M.L., trial counsel secured a stipulation that, at the
preliminary hearing, M.L. did not testify that Cramer asked him if it felt good when Cramer
fondled him {id. at 304-306).
Cramer did not testify at trial.
The jury convicted Cramer on both counts (id. at 338-39). The Utah Supreme Court
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affirmed. State v. Cramer, 44 P.3d 690, 2002 UT 9.
POST-CONVICTION CASE
Cramer filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief ("Petition") (R. 15). As relevant
to this appeal, he claimed that 1) his trial counsel were ineffective because they did not obtain
DCFS's records on the investigation of M.L.'s accusations (CPS records); 2) his trial counsel
were ineffective for failing to call several witnesses to testify on his behalf; 3) his trial counsel
were ineffective for failing to obtain and admit as an exhibit the CASA logs that he prepared;
4) his lead trial counsel was ineffective and denied Cramer his right to testify by telling him that
she would not call him as a witness and by threatening to "step on his neck if he tried to testify;"
5) his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims; and 6) his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to supplement the record on
appeal with M.L.'s UNI records that the trial court reviewed in camera.
The State moved for partial summary judgment, which the post-conviction court granted
in part and denied in part (R. 194-232 and 253-73). The post-conviction court limited the
remaining claims for adjudication to whether appellate counsel were ineffective for omitting
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims because trial counsel allegedly 1) did not obtain Det
Huggard's, Kyle Cook's, and Linda Vraybill's records and did not use those records to impeach
M.L.'s testimony; 2) did not investigate and call various, additional defense witnesses identified
in the attachments to the petition; 3) did not use Cramer's CASA logs to impeach M.L.'s
testimony; and 4) denied Cramer his right to testify. (R. 254-73.)
In its July 18, 2005, Memorandum Decision, the post-conviction court rejected the
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remaining claims and denied relief (R. 529-35, addendum B).
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
I.

Procedurally barred ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims.
Cramer claims that he may raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in post-

conviction even though he could have, but did not raise them on direct appeal. The PostConviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars relief on all claims that could have been, but were not
raised on direct appeal. Even pre-PCRA law precluded relief on ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claims that could have been, but were not raised on direct appeal. Cramer may obtain
relief only if he can prove that his appellate counsel were ineffective for omitting the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims that he raised in post-conviction.
II.

Appellate challenges to Cramer's failure to testify.
Cramer claims that appellate counsel should have sought reversal because 1) the trial

court conducted no on-the-record colloquy concerning Cramer's right to testify; 2) trial counsel
were ineffective because they did not advise Cramer that he had a constitutional right to testify
despite their advice not to; and 3) trial counsel allegedly coerced and overbore Cramer's
constitutional right to testify.
Cramer had to prove that his appellate counsel overlooked a claim that was obvious from
the record and probably would have succeeded. As to all three claims, Cramer presented no
proof of any information that his appellate counsel had that would have pointed to an obvious
appellate challenge to his failure to testify.
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Cramer concedes that the absence of an on-the-record colloquy about his right to testify
did not present an obvious appellate winner, recognizing that this Court's precedent foreclosed
that claim. Cramer's concession defeats his challenge to appellate counsel's effectiveness. He
identifies arguments that he claims appellate counsel could have made to challenge the Court's
precedent. However, he had a constitutional right only to counsel who would find existing law,
not to counsel who would argue for changes in the law. In addition, appellate counsel could not
have succeeded on those arguments: they were not preserved in the trial court and could not
constitute obvious error because they were inconsistent with controlling precedent.
In order to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim that probably would have succeeded, Cramer had to prove that appellate
counsel could have proven both deficient performance by trial counsel, and that any proven
deficient performance prejudiced Cramer.

Cramer did not prove that appellate counsel

overlooked an obvious claim that probably would have succeeded with respect to trial counsel's
advice about testifying.

Cramer argues his trial counsel never told him that he had a

constitutional right to testify despite their advice not to. However, the post-conviction court
found that trial counsel thoroughly covered the subject of him testifying. Cramer has not met
his burden of marshaling the evidence to show that the post-conviction erred in that finding.
In addition, Cramer cites no controlling authority that required trial counsel to caution him that
he had a constitutional right to testify despite their advice. Without that controlling authority,
he failed to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim under existing law.
Cramer's argument that his trial counsel overbore his will depends on facts found against
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him.
Finally, Cramer proved no prejudice from his failure to testify. He argues that, if he had
testified, the jury would have heard equally plausible accounts from equally impeached witnesses.
The evidence does not support that proposition. Cramer testified at the post-conviction hearing
about what he would have testified to before the jury. That testimony included no denial of
M.L.'s accusations. Moreover, Cramer's testimony would have opened the door to the jury
hearing that he pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with two other young boys under
circumstances similar to those which M.L. described. Cramer's testimony would have bolstered
rather than called into question M.L.'s accusations.
III.

Failure to supplement the direct-appeal record.
Cramer's trial counsel sought access to M.L.'s UNI records. The trial court reviewed the

records in camera and concluded that they included nothing suitable for disclosure under
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). On appeal, Cramer argued that the trial court
erroneously refused to turn over the records. The supreme court rejected the claim because
Cramer did not include the UNI records in the direct appeal record, noting that he had not
followed the Court's c,iggestion at oral argument that he do so.
In post-conviction, Cramer claimed that his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing
to supplement the record. The post-conviction judge rejected the claim because the same judge
sitting as the trial judge had "already reviewed the records in camera . . . and found nothing
material," and because Cramer "fail[ed] to demonstrate any deficiency in [the trial court's] review
of the records." (R. 270-71.)
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Cramer cannot prove error in the post-conviction court's ruling because he has failed to
include the UNI records in the post-conviction appellate record. The supreme court rejected
his direct appeal claim because, without having the UNI records to review, it could not
determine whether the trial court erroneously withheld any of them. Likewise, Cramer cannot
prove that the post-conviction court erroneously rejected his ineffective assistance claim without
the records because, without them, he cannot prove that the post-conviction court should have
found that, had appellate counsel included the records in the direct appeal record, Cramer
probably would have succeeded on direct appeal.
IV.

Investigation of documents and witnesses.
Cramer claims that appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel's investigation

and use of the witnesses he identified, the CASA logs, and the CPS report. Cramer failed to
identify an obvious ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim. The documents and letter
identifying the witnesses were not in the appellate record. He presented no proof of information
that he provided to appellate counsel that would have alerted them to this claim.
Alternatively, his post-conviction evidence failed to prove that the claim probably would
have succeeded. Trial counsel's investigator contacted all of the witnesses Cramer identified and
provided a report to counsel. Counsel remembered at least two who were hostile to Cramer.
The others were character witnesses; counsel feared that calling character witnesses would open
the door to Cramer's prior guilty pleas to lewdness with two other young boys. Because trial
counsel thoroughly investigated the witnesses Cramer identified, appellate counsel could not
have succeeded on a challenge to her decision not to call them. In addition, Cramer did not
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prove that any of the witnesses could have provided evidence that would have made a more
favorable outcome at trial reasonably likely.
Trial counsel obtained and reviewed the CASA logs prior to trial. After doing so, she
determined not to admit them as an exhibit. At the post-conviction hearing, she explained the
reasons for her decision. Because trial counsel thoroughly investigated the CASA logs and made
a strategic decision not to use them, appellate counsel could not have succeeded on a challenge
to her decision not to admit them as an exhibit.
Counsel admitted that she did not remember seeing the CPS report, but testified that she
knew about the information it contained. Cramer provided no proof that anything in the report
varied so dramatically from what the jury heard that its absence undermines confidence in the
outcome.
Finally, Cramer failed to prove that appellate counsel could have proven prejudice. He
contends that the witnesses and documents, coupled with his testimony, would have presented
the jury with equally plausible stories. The jury would not have heard equally plausible stories.
V.

Cumulative error.
Cramer argues that, if appellate counsel's alleged errors were not individually prejudicial,

they were cumulatively prejudicial. Cramer proved only one incident of deficient performance:
appellate counsel should have supplemented the appellate record with the UNI records. Cramer
proved no prejudice on that claim.
Moreover, the case that he claims his trial counsel should have presented and which he
supported with evidence at the post-conviction proceeding would have assured his conviction.
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Rather than hearing only M.L.'s uncorroborated accusations with the inconsistencies in his
accounts highlighted, the jury would have heard no denial from Cramer to M.L.'s accusations
and evidence that Cramer pleaded guilty to touching other little boys inappropriately under
circumstances similar to those that M.L. described. If the jury convicted on the case it heard,
the jury certainly would have convicted on the case Cramer now says he wanted it to hear.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-TRIAL COUNSEL CLAIMS THAT
COULD HAVE BEEN, BUT WERE N O T RAISED O N DIRECT
APPEAL ARE PROCEDURALLY BARRED
Cramer insists that he may raise his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the
first time in post-conviction proceedings. Appellant's Brief at 19, 26, 31, and 44. Controlling
law supports the post-conviction court's ruling to the contrary (R. 529-30).
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars relief for all claims that could have
been, but were not raised during the direct appeal, and does not exclude ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004). Cf. also Carter v.
Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 \\\

(finding under pre-PCRA law that several ineffective-

assistance-of-trial-counsel claims were procedurally barred because Carter could have, but did
not raise them on direct appeal). As even Cramer recognizes, his appellate counsel could have,
but did not challenge trial counsel's performance during the direct appeal. Appellant's Brief at
20-24. See State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991) (appellant may challenge trial
counsel's performance on direct appeal when there is an adequate record and he has new
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counsel on appeal); Utah R. App. P. 23B (permitting a remand during a direct appeal to develop
a record in support of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim). The post-conviction
court correctly applied controlling law to bar Cramer's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims. The court correctly assess those claims only in the context of Cramer's challenge to his
appellate counsers failure to raise them on direct appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2) (West
2004) ("a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been but was
not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance
of counsel").
Cramer's authority does not support his argument that he may raise the ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time in post-conviction. To support that argument
he relies solely on Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990), citing it for the proposition that
"constitutional issues such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel can always be raised in
collateral post-conviction proceedings, regardless of whether or not they were raised in direct
appeal." Appellant's Brief at 26 and 31. According to Cramer, Dunn holds that "ineffective
assistance may be raised in a post-conviction proceeding even if not raised on direct appeal
because a post-conviction remedy is to provide a means for collaterally attacking convictions
that are constitutionally flawed, and the general policy favoring finality of judgments cannot
prevail against a post-conviction collateral attack because c[a]s important as finality is, it does not
have a higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty.'" Appellant's Brief at 26-27 (citing
Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d at 875-77.)
Cramer misstates the Dunn holding. Only one justice concurred in the reasoning on
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which Cramer relies. Dunn v. Cook, 719 P.2d at 879. Two expressly rejected it. Id. at 879-90.
Therefore, Dunn did not hold what Cramer claims it held.
Dunn actually supports the State's argument that Cramer could obtain post-conviction
relief only on his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims. A majority of the supreme court
agreed that Dunn could raise the trial-counsel claims in post-conviction only because his
appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting them on appeal. Id. at 875-80.
POINT II
CRAMER DID N O T PROVE THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL
WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR OMITTING CHALLENGES TO HIS
FAILURE TO TESTIFY
Cramer argues that appellate counsel should have sought reversal because 1) the trial
court conducted no on-the-record colloquy concerning Cramer's right to testify; 2) trial counsel
were ineffective because they did not advise Cramer that he had a constitutional right to testify
despite their advice not to; and 3) trial counsel allegedly prevented Cramer from exercising his
right to testify by coercing him and overbearing his will. Appellant's Brief at 19-33 and 35-39.
Cramer affirmatively waived the third claim; he cannot rely on it for reversal. As to all three
claims, he failed to meet his burden of proving that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious
error the probably would have succeeded.
A.

Additional relevant facts.
Prior to trial, Cramer pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with a child. The counts

involved two different boys from the same family. The State alleged that the events took place
at a swimming pool. (R. 547 at 29-31, 45-46.)
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Trial counsel moved to exclude the two prior convictions (R. 641-44). The trial court
ruled that the convictions were admissible. (R. 723 at 37.)
After that ruling, but prior to trial, one of Cramer's victims died, and State's counsel
determined not to call the other. The trial court then ruled that the State could bring in evidence
of the prior lewdness convictions only if Cramer testified. (R. 547 at 55.)
At the preliminary hearing, trial counsel advised Cramer on the record that he had the
right to testify at the preliminary hearing, and Cramer had at least one meeting with counsel after
the preliminary hearing, but before trial (id. at 9, 32-33).
Cramer did not testify at trial. In post-conviction, Cramer claimed that his trial counsel
threatened to "step on his neck" if he tried to testify. He testified at the post-conviction hearing
that his counsel told him that he was not going to testify, and that they would not discuss it
further. He further testified that he did not know that he had the right to testify even if counsel
advised him not to (R. 354; 547 at 10, 12).
During the post-conviction hearing, Cramer testified that, if he had testified at trial, he
could have explained what the CASA logs were and why he wrote them. He could have
explained the Child Protective Services investigation report (CCCPS report") and procedures. He
could have explained that the DCFS procedures required making a determination whether an
abuse allegation was substantiated.3 He could have explained that DCFS did not follow their
ordinary procedures with him because they did not contact him. He could have "helped" the
jury understand his role with M.L. and his history as a child advocate. (Id. at 14-16). However,
3

As detailed in Point IV, the DCFS investigator concluded that M.L.'s accusation was
substantiated.
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he never denied M.L.'s allegations, even after the State's post-conviction counsel asked him
whether there was anything else he thought was important to put on record about what he
would have testified to at trial (id. at 44).4
Cramer's trial counsel, Ms. Kim Clark and Mr. John O'Connell, Jr., also testified at the
post-conviction hearing. Ms. Clark testified that, after the trial judge ruled that the State could
introduce Cramer's guilty pleas to lewdness with two other young boys, she planned to call
Cramer to testify if he wanted to testify. She explained that, based on the judge's ruling, she did
not think it would hurt Cramer's case to have him testify. (Id. at 67-68).
However, after circumstances changed so that Cramer's prior guilty pleas to lewdness
with two other young boys would not come in unless Cramer testified, Ms. Clark advised Cramer
not to testify due to the way juries view "prior consistent offenses." She explained that, based
on her experience, "if the jury heard that he had done something like this before that their
conclusion most likely would be that he had done this offense." She explained further that she
believed that "it was a really bad idea for [the jury] to hear that [Cramer] had a prior offense,
actually two that were similar," and that "they'd be more likely to convict." (Id. at 55, 68.)
Cramer's post-conviction counsel asked Ms. Clark whether she advised Cramer that "he
had a right to testify on his own behalf despite [her advice] not to." Ms. Clark responded, "I
don't believe I put it in those terms, no." (Id. at 57.) Mr. O'Connell agreed that he had no

^ h e State's post-conviction counsel emphasized in his closing argument that Cramer
never testified at the post-conviction hearing that he would have denied M.L.'s abuse
allegations if he had testified at trial (id. at 116). Cramer did not challenge that argument on
rebuttal or seek to re-open the evidence to testify that he would have denied the allegations if
he had testified at trial.
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specific recollection of telling Cramer that Cramer had a right to testify despite counsel's advice
not to (id. at 96-97).
When asked how Cramer reacted to the advice not to testify, Ms. Clarke responded, "I
don't think he said anything, he just nodded and looked at me." She also testified that Cramer
never told her that he wanted to testify despite her advice that it would be a bad idea, and that
she did not recall Cramer telling her during trial that he wanted to testify. She repeatedly
characterized the decision whether to testify as belonging to Cramer. Mr. O'Connell testified
that he had no recollection of Cramer stating that he wanted to testify, but allowed that it was
possible Cramer did. (id. at 68-69, 100-101).
Ms. Clark specifically denied threatening Cramer to keep him off the stand, testifying, "I
never do that to my own clients." She also denied threatening to step on Cramer's neck,
testifying, "I've never said that statement ever in my whole existence. It's not a phrase that I
would use and it's nothing I'd heard before this petition." (Id. at 68-69.)
In his closing argument, Cramer's post-conviction attorney asserted that Cramer was not
arguing that he was denied his right to testify. Rather, he was arguing only that he was never
advised of that right; therefore, he did not waive it knowingly. (Id. at 120.)
The post-conviction court rejected Cramer's claims concerning his right to testify. The
court wrote, "[l]ooking at Ms. Clark's and Mr. O'Connell's testimonies as a whole, the Court
finds that the issue of Petitioner testifying at trial was thoroughly covered by counsel." The
court found "not credible" Cramer's testimony that his counsel threatened him if he tried to
testify. The court further found that Cramer's incredible assertions about counsel threatening
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him raised "an issue" about the credibility of the rest of Cramer's post-conviction testimony.
(R. 532-34.)
B.

Cramer failed to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
In order to demonstrate that his appellate counsel were ineffective, Cramer had the

burden of proving that his arguments concerning his failure to testify were obvious from the
record, and that they probably would have succeeded. Carter v. Galetka„ 44 P.3d 626,2001 UT
96, ^48.5 Cramer failed to meet that burden.
As to all three claims, Cramer has never identified what information appellate counsel
had that should have alerted them to any appellate claim grounded in his failure to testify.
Cramer merely failed to take the stand; criminal defendants often do not. The preliminary
hearing record included trial counsel's advice that Cramer had the right to testify at the
preliminary hearing; nothing in the record suggests that he had a different understanding about
trial. Trial counsel thoroughly explored the inconsistencies in M.L.'s accounts. The trial court
ruled that, if Cramer testified, the jury could hear that he pleaded guilty to two counts of
lewdness with two other young boys. Nothing in the appellate record would have made it
obvious to appellate counsel that Cramer wished to take the stand, offer no denial of M.L.'s
accusations, and let the jury hear about his prior guilty pleas.
Similarly, Cramer presented no evidence of anything he told appellate counsel that would

5

Cramer argues that the probably-would-have-succeeded standard adopted in Carter
overstates his burden of proof and invites the Court not to follow it. Appellant's Brief at 2122. Carter is a Utah Supreme Court case; this Court is bound to follow supreme court
precedent. See, e.g., State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (a lower court must
follow strictly the decisions of a higher court), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995).
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have alerted them to any problem with his failure to testify. He never proved that he repeated
to appellate counsel the facts on which he relied in post-conviction to complain about his failure
to testify.

He cannot fault his counsel for failing to divine those facts. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (the constitutional sufficiency of counsel's performance
depends in large part on the information his client provides).
Cramer's failure to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious challenge to his
failure to testify independentiy defeats his claim. Carter v. Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^[48 (Cramer
must prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim).
Cramer did not prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious argument for reversal
based on the absence of an on-the-record colloquy advising Cramer about his right to testify.
To the contrary, Cramer acknowledges that "the issue would not have been an obvious winner"
because this Court previously rejected the claim in State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah App.
1992).

Appellant's Brief at 35.

Nevertheless he argues that appellate counsel had a

constitutional obligation to argue for the colloquy because 1) Brooks included no separate state
constitutional analysis, the issue is significant, and there purportedly exists an "emerging trend"
toward an on-the-record colloquy;6 2) Brooks voluntarily chose not to testify; Cramer
6

This Court did not ignore the issue of a separate state constitutional analysis in
Brooks, It recognized that Brooks argued for such an analysis, but found his arguments
unpersuasive. State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d at 364 n.2. Cramer identifies no argument that his
appellate counsel should have recognized that would have been sufficient to meet their
"substantial burden" to justify overturning Brooks' rejection of a separate state constitutional
rule. See, e.g., State v. Menkes, 889 P.2d at 398 (party seeking to overturn existing precedent
have a substantial burden to justify doing so).
Although Cramer argues that there is an "emerging trend" toward requiring such a
colloquy, he cites no authority to establish such a shift in authority that counsel could have
met the "substantial burden" to justify overturning Brooks. Indeed, he cites only Boyd v.
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"persistently maintained that he wanted to testify, but was precluded from doing so by his
counsel;"7 and 3) the United States Supreme Court stated in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987),
that the right to testify is even more fundamental than the right to self-representation, and, if the
right to self-representation without counsel requires an on-the-record colloquy, then the right
to testify should.8 Appellant's Brief at 38-39.
Despite these suggested arguments, Cramer's concession that appellate counsel
overlooked no "obvious winner" in light of Brooks defeats his claim. By his own admission, he
cannot prove either element of his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim: that
appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim. Carter P. Galetka, 2001 UT 96 ^[48.
Moreover, Cramer only had the right to appellate counsel who would find existing law.
See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1052 (10th Cir.) ("we have rejected ineffective assistance

United States, 586 A.2d 670 (D.C. App 1991), for the proposition that such a trend is
emerging. Appellant's Brief at 38. This Court rejected the Boyd analysis in Brooks. State v.
Brooks, 833 P.2d at 364-65.
7

This argument relies on facts that the record does not support or that were resolved
against him by the post-conviction court. The post-conviction court found that trial counsel
did not prevent Cramer from testifying. In another argument, Cramer cited to trial counsel's
post-conviction testimony to support his assertion that he "persistently" asked to testify. As
detailed below, the assertion misstates trial counsel's testimony. Trial counsel testified that
Cramer was generally persistent. However, she testified that, when she advised Cramer not
to testify because it would result in the jury hearing that he pleaded guilty to lewdness with
two other young boys, Cramer looked at her and nodded. (R. 547 at 56 and 68.)
8

Cramer's logic is flawed. A court must inquire only when a defendant exercises his
right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 835 (1975). Cramer cites no
authority, and the State is aware of none, that requires an on-record-colloquy every time a
defendant fails to exercise his right to self-representation. Cramer's argument does not
demonstrate that this Court erroneously held that a trial court need not conduct an on-therecord colloquy every time a defendant fails to exercise his right to testify.
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claims where a defendant 'faults his former counsel not for failing to find existing law, but for
failing to predict future law' and have warned 'that clairvoyance is not a required attribute of
effective representation"'), cert denied, 537 U.S. 1093 (2002). See also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510, 523 (2003) (counsel's performance must be assessed from her '"perspective at the time"')
(citation omitted). As Cramer acknowledges, existing law foreclosed the very claim that he
argues counsel should have pursued. Appellant's Brief at 35, citing State v. brooks, 833 P.2d 362
(Utah App. 1992). Although he proffers arguments that appellate counsel could have made to
change that law, he had no constitutional right to counsel who would argue for a change in the
law.
Cramer also failed to prove that the appellate argument probably would have succeeded
because he cannot prove that appellate counsel could have met their burden on this unpreserved
claim. Cramer did not make any of his present arguments in the trial court; therefore, appellate
counsel could have succeeded only if they could have demonstrated that the trial court obviously
erred by not conducting an on-the-record colloquy. State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734, 2005 UT
7 ^[46-48. To meet that burden, they would have had to demonstrate, among other things, that
the requirement for an on-the-record colloquy about Cramer's right to testify was so well
established by Utah law that the trial court should have recognized and complied with it even
though Cramer never raised the issue. See State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah) (error not
obvious where the appellate decision requiring the omitted action had not yet been decided), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). As Cramer recognizes, the well-established law holds the opposite.
His appellate counsel could not have demonstrated the obvious error component of a plain error
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argument.
According to Cramer, his appellate counsel also should have argued that his trial counsel
were ineffective in advising him about his right to testify. To succeed on these claims, Cramer
had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven constitutionally deficient performance
by trial counsel. He had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven specific acts or
omissions by trial counsel that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 521. He had to prove
that appellate counsel could have overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered
adequate assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685
(Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522.
Cramer argues that he proved that trial counsel never informed him of his right to testify.
Appellant's Brief at 26. The argument depends on facts found against him. The post-conviction
court found that trial counsel "thoroughly covered" the issue of Cramer testifying at trial (R. 547
at 533). To challenge that finding, Cramer must "combQ the record for and compilfe] all the
evidence" that supports the post-conviction court's finding.

Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan

Manufacturing Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 2002 UT 94 ^[21; Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 2004 UT 82
^|20 (appellant must marshal the evidence "if a determination of the correctness of a court's
application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive").

He '"must present, in

comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings [he] resists.5" Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82 %I1 (citation omitted). He
must "'temporarily remove [his] own prejudices and fully embrace [respondent's] position'; he
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. . . must play the "devil's advocate/"" Id. at f78 (citation omitted). Then, he must demonstrate
that the marshaled evidence was legally insufficient to support the challenged finding. Wilson
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Manufacturing Corp., 2002 UT 94 ^[21.
Cramer has not met that burden. Ms. Clark advised Cramer on the record that he had
the right to testify at the preliminary hearing; Cramer cites nothing to support finding that he
would have lesser rights at trial. When asked whether she told Cramer that he had a "right" to
testify despite her advice, Ms. Clark responded only that she did not believe that she put it "in
those terms" (R. 547 at 57). However, she never testified that she misinformed Cramer that he
could not make the choice. Moreover, she testified that she advised Cramer not to testify (id.
at 55, 67). Inherent in "advising" a client not to testify is the acknowledgment that the decision
belongs to the client. Although the post-conviction court did not believe Cramer's assertion that
Ms. Clark threatened to "step on his neck" if he tried to testify, that assertion reveals that
Cramer understood that he could testify despite her advice: he falsely claimed that his counsel
threatened violence against him if he attempted to exercise that right. The evidence Cramer fails
to marshal supports the post-conviction court's finding that counsel "thoroughly covered" the
issue of whether he would testify.
Even if Cramer had proved that his trial counsel did not inform him that he had the right
to testify despite their advice, he identifies no controlling case law available to appellate or trial
counsel that required trial counsel to do so.9 Even the non-controlling authority on which
Cramer relies recognizes that the federal circuits split on whether counsel have an affirmative

9

Cramer relies only on one published federal circuit court decision, one unpublished
circuit court decision, and one federal district court decision. Appellant's Brief at 25.
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duty to advise their clients that they have the right to testify despite counsel's advice. Artu^ v.
Brown, 124 F.3d 73, 78-79 (2nd Cir. 1997). Appellate counsel had no constitutional obligation to
argue that trial counsel had a duty that existing law did not impose. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d
at 1052; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 523. Similarly, appellate counsel could not have proven
deficient performance because trial counsel failed to perform a duty that the law did not clearly
impose. See Smallmod v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999) (person challenging
counsel's effectiveness cannot demonstrate deficient performance merely by demonstrating that
trial counsel did not do what was "prudent or appropriate;" he must demonstrate that counsel
failed to do what the constitution compelled), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 980 (2000). Cf. also State v.
Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906-907 (Ut. App. 1994) (comparing obvious error to deficient
performance), reversed on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996).10
Cramer also argues that his appellate counsel should have argued that trial counsel
overbore his will and prevented him from exercising his right to testify. Appellant's Brief at 29-

10

Cramer argues that the Tenth Circuit has held that "failing to advise an accused of
his right to testify and that he has the right to disregard counsel's advice not to testify is
sufficient to meet" the deficient performance element of Strickland. Appellant's Brief at 25
(citing United States v. Hershberger, slip op. 90-3237 at 3 (10th Cir. July 24, 1991)). He leaves the
impression that the Tenth Circuit has held that counsel must give such advice in all
circumstances. That impression is false. The Tenth Circuit held that Hershberger would be
entided to relief if he could "prove that his counsel prevented him from testifying by
asserting that counsel, rather than defendant, would make the decision whether defendant
would testify." The court also held that Hershberger's "allegations that defense counsel
failed to inform him that he alone controlled the decision to testify and that defense counsel
failed to let him testify despite his expressed desire to do so, if proved, would be sufficient to
meet the first requirement of the Strickland'test" Id. (emphasis added). As detailed in the
text, Cramer did not prove that defense counsel refused to let him testify despite his desire to
do so, or that they misled him to believe that the decision whether he would testify was theirs
rather than his.
25

33. The Court may not reverse on this claim because Cramer affirmatively waived it in the postconviction court. During the post-conviction hearing, Cramer insisted that he was arguing only
that he was not advised of his right to testify, which resulted in him waiving it unknowingly. He
specifically disavowed any claim that he was denied that right. (R. 547 at 120). Having waived
the claim, he cannot ask this Court to rely on it as a reason to reverse. See, e.g, State v. Bullock, 791
P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989) (appellate court will not reverse based on a claim that the appellant
affirmatively waived in the lower court), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
Alternatively, Cramer failed to prove that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious claim
that trial counsel overbore his will. On appeal, Cramer asserts that 1) he "was 'persistent5 in
letting trial counsel know that he wanted to testify;" 2) trial counsel was adamant about Cramer
not testifying; 3) counsel told Cramer that he was not going to testify; 4) counsel threatened to
'"step on his neck"' if he tried to testify; and 5) trial counsel, instead of telling Cramer that he
could override her advice, told Cramer that she would not discuss the issue with him again.
Appellant's Brief at 30.
As to the first, Cramer asserts that trial counsel noted that Cramer "was 'persistent' in
letting trial counsel know that he wanted to testify." Appellant's Brief at 30. He misstates
counsel's testimony. Ms. Clark agreed with Cramer's post-conviction counsel's statement that
Cramer is "mild-mannered" and "not forceful." She added that Cramer is "persistent." (R. 547
at 56.) However, the testimony refers to her perception of Cramer's general characteristics, not
whether he wanted to testify. Counsel testified that Cramer responded to her advice not to
testify by looking at her and nodding. She did not recall Cramer ever stating that he wanted to
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testify despite her advice against it. (R. 547 at 56, 68.)
The remainder of Cramer's assertions depend on his testimony. The post-conviction
court found that his assertion that counsel threatened him was not credible, and that assertion
raised an issue about the credibility of the rest of his testimony. The court also found that
counsel thoroughly covered the issue of whether Cramer would testify, which necessarily means
that the Court rejected Cramer's assertion that counsel refused to discuss the issue.
Cramer also had the burden of proving that appellate counsel could have proven
prejudice. Cramer had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven that trial counsel's
errors undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694; Parsons
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522. Cramer had to prove that appellate counsel could have proven that,
but for trial counsel's errors, 1) he would have testified; and 2) his testimony would have made
a more favorable outcome reasonably likely. Cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-38 (2003)
(holding that, to prove prejudice from counsel's capital penalty phase investigation and
presentation, Wiggins had to prove both that 1) a reasonably competent attorney would have
presented the undiscovered mitigation evidence at the penalty hearing; and 2) there is a
reasonable probability that, if counsel had presented the evidence, at least one juror would have
struck the balance of aggravating and mitigating evidence in Wiggin's favor). Cramer did not
meet that burden.
Cramer argues that, had he testified, "the jury would have been given the choice between
two different stories^/0 equally impeached witnesses?* Appellant's Brief at 32 (emphasis added).
He continues that "equally plausible stories from competing, imperfect witnesses" raises a
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reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome. Id. (emphasis added).
Whether equally plausible stories from equally impeached witnesses is sufficient to prove
prejudice is irrelevant to this case because Cramer did not prove that that is what the jury would
have heard. The jury heard that M.L. accused Cramer of fondling him at swimming pools. They
also heard that M.L. initially denied any abuse, although later explained that he did so because
he was afraid. They heard that his accounts of the abuse changed between the two interviews
with Detective Huggard, changed again at the preliminary hearing, and changed yet again at trial.
They heard testimony about Cramer's CASA log entries, specifying some of what he did with
M.L. and that he spent an "inordinate amount" of time with him. Had Cramer testified, the jury
also would have heard 1) Cramer's explanations about some of the CASA log entries (that he
intended to provide bonding experiences with M.L. to prepare him for adoption), 2) no denial
of M.L.'s abuse allegations, and 3) that Cramer pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with
two other boys involving conduct at a swimming pool.
The jury would not have heard two equally "plausible stories" from "equally impeached"
witnesses. The jury would have heard M.L.'s undenied accusations bolstered by the evidence
that Cramer previously molested two other boys under circumstances similar to those M.L.
described. Indeed, Cramer's testimony would have undone counsel's impeachment of M.L.
Cramer has not proven that adding his testimony to that which the jury heard would raise a
reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome.
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POINT III
CRAMER'S APPELLATE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT T H E POST-CONVICTION COURT
INCORRECTLY REJECTED HIS CLAIM THAT HIS APPELLATE
COUNSEL WERE INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SUPPLEMENT
T H E APPELLATE RECORD WITH HIS UNI RECORDS
Cramer claims that his appellate counsel were ineffective because they argued that the
trial court erroneously failed to turn over the UNI records, but failed to supplement the
appellate record with the UNI records. The State conceded that counsel were deficient.
However, the Cramer has not proven that the post-conviction court should have granted him
relief: he has not included the UNI records in the post-conviction appellate record.
A.

Additional facts.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved for access to all of M.L.'s UNI records and served

subpoenas on UNI. Defense counsel also moved to compel disclosure of "all psychological and
psychiatric records of [M.L.'s] from March 18, 1996 to the present date5' (R. 611-18, 622-32).
The trial court held two hearings on trial counsel's discovery requests (R. 619-21,633-34,
723). At the second, the trial court agreed to review M.L.'s UNI records in camera, but required
trial counsel to prepare a written request specifying the particular information in the records that
counsel believed would be material to Cramer's defense (R. 633-34,723 at 21 -22). Trial counsel
listed eighteen specific categories of information that the trial court should look for in the
records (R. 635-37).
The trial court denied Cramer's motion to compel. The trial court reviewed the records
in camera and "found no records appropriate for release under [Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39
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(1987)]" (R. 635-37).
On direct appeal, Cramer argued, among other things, that the trial court erroneously
ruled, based on its in camera review, that none of M.L.'s UNI records was material. The Utah
Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in part, that it could not review the trial court's ruling because
Cramer did not include the UNI records in the appellate record. As to the latter, the supreme
court observed that Cramer should have requested permission to file the records under seal, and
that appellate counsel did not move to supplement the record even after the Court pointed out
the omission during oral argument. See generally State v. Cramer, 44 P.3d 690,2002 UT 9 ffi[25-28.
The post-conviction court rejected Cramer's claim that appellate counsel were ineffective.
The court recognized that the State conceded deficient performance. The court rejected the
claim because the same judge sitting as the trial judge had "already reviewed the records in camera
. . . and found nothing material," and because Cramer "fail[ed] to demonstrate any deficiency
in [the trial court's] review of the records." (R. 270-71.)
B.

Cramer has demonstrated no error in the post-conviction court's ruling; to the contrary,
his failure to include the records in the post-conviction appeal repeats the error that
defeated his direct appeal.
Cramer faults his appellate attorneys because they did not include the UNI records in the

appellate record. To succeed on this claim, he had to prove that, had appellate counsel done so,
his appellate claim probably would have succeeded. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96
TJ48. Cramer would have won on appeal only if appellate counsel proved that failing to disclose
the UNI records undermined confidence in the outcome. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 5962 (1987) (holding that courts must provide the defense with "material evidence" and defining
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"material evidence" to mean that the failure to provide it undermines confidence in the
outcome).
As he did on direct appeal, Cramer failed to include those records in this appeal His
failure to do so makes the direct appeal decision dispositive of his post-conviction appeal. The
supreme court could not determine on direct appeal whether the trial court erroneously withheld
evidence material to Cramer's defense because Cramer did not include the UNI records in the
direct appeal record. State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9 ^[25-28. Likewise, this Court cannot determine
whether the post-conviction court should have found that the direct appeal probably would have
succeeded had counsel included the UNI records because Cramer has not included those records
in this appeal. Id. See also State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (1997) (Taylor failed to demonstrate
prejudice concerning mental health mitigation investigation when he produced none of the
mental health evidence that he claimed that his trial counsel could have discovered), cert, denied,
525 U.S. 833 (1998).
Cramer rationalizes his failure by speculating that the UNI records provided to the trial
court could not be recreated now and UNI would have refused to provide them just as it did at
trial. Appellant's Brief at 34. He offers nothing more than his unsupported statement to argue
that the records could not be recreated.11 The trial court judge ordered UNI to turn over the

n

Even if true, the inability to recreate those records would preclude post-conviction
relief. Cramer has the burden of proving his entidement to post-conviction relief. See, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105 (West 2004). If he cannot do so because the records cannot
be recreated, then the claim fails. See Parson v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522-23 (Utah), cert, denied,
513 U.S. 966 (1994) (Parsons asked the supreme court to excuse indigent, incarcerated
petitioners from proving Stickland prejudice because they lacked the resources to develop the
necessary evidence; the supreme court rejected the request).
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records for in camera review; Cramer offers no reason why the same judge sitting as the postconviction judge would not have done the same. Without providing the records in the postconviction appeal, Cramer cannot prove that the post-conviction court should have found that
appellate counsel, had they included the records in the direct appeal, probably would have
succeeded on Cramer's claim that the trial court withheld "material evidence" in the UNI
records.
IV
CRAMER FAILED TO PROVE THAT APPELLATE COUNSEL
SHOULD
HAVE CHALLENGED
TRIAL
COUNSEL'S
INVESTIGATION OF WITNESSES A N D DOCUMENTS
Cramer claims that his appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel's 1)
investigation of and decision not to call the witnesses Cramer identified for them, 2) decision
not to admit the CASA logs as exhibits, and 3) investigation of and failure to use the CPS report.
Appellant's Brief at 39-48. Cramer failed to prove that counsel overlooked a claim that was
obvious from the record or that probably would have succeeded.
A.

Additional relevant facts.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved for access to Cramer's CASA logs (Cramer's reports

of his interactions with M.L. as a CASA volunteer (R. 547 at 15-16)) and all of DCFS's records
for M.L. (R. 611-18). Counsel obtained and reviewed the CASA logs. Trial counsel recognized
that the defense could have admitted the records without Cramer's testimony. (R. 547 at 62-63.)
However, she did not consider the CASA records helpful overall. First, admitting the logs as
an exhibit would have allowed the jury to calculate the amount of time Cramer spent with M.L.
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This contravened the defense strategy of trying to minimize how much time it appeared that
Cramer spent with MX. (Id at 65, 91.)
Second, counsel considered the information in the logs "self-serving." She thought that
also presented a problem for using them in Cramer's defense. (Id. at 64-65.)
Third, admitting the CASA logs into evidence without calling Cramer to testify would
have allowed the jury to see things that looked bad, such as entries that State's post-conviction
counsel emphasized in his examination of Cramer that Cramer tickled and cuddled with M.L.,
drove M.L. to a campsite where M.L. sat on Cramer's lap and played a flute, and discussed the
anatomical differences between boys and girls at a swimming pool (M.L. claimed Cramer
molested him at swimming pools they frequented together). Trial counsel did not want to call
Cramer to explain these things because the jury then would have learned that Cramer pleaded
guilty to lewdness with two other boys at swimming pools. (Id at 39-41, 64-65, 91-92.)
The CPS records were the Child Protective Service's report generated by DCFS as a
result of M.L.'s abuse accusation. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that the
CPS report format did not look like a format that she had seen before, but that she had seen the
information contained in the CPS report. (R. 547 at 15, 21, 95.)
Prior to trial, Cramer wrote counsel a letter identifying witnesses whom he believed
would be helpful. The defense investigator gave trial counsel a written report of every witness
he contacted. The investigator contacted every witnesses trial counsel asked him to contact, and
counsel believed that she gave the investigator every name that Cramer provided to her. Most
of the witnesses were character witnesses. At least two were adverse to Cramer: Linda Vraybil
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(an adoption case worker whom Cramer admitted did not like him), and Sue Mineer (the mother
of the two victims in the lewdness case).12 Trial counsel believed that the character witness
testimony would have opened the door to admitting the prior guilty pleas to lewdness with Ms.
Mineer's sons. (EL 547 at 23, 92-93.)
Cramer apparently never identified a witness who saw Cramer with M.L. at the swimming
pools where M.L. testified that the abuse occurred.
B.

Cramer never proved that appellate counsel overlooked an obvious ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim that probably would have succeeded.
Cramer concludes that "it should have been obvious to appellate counsel to raise trial

counsel's failure to investigate potential witnesses and documents." Appellant's Brief at 44.
However, he never states why.
In fact, Cramer never proved the obviousness element of his ineffective-assistance-ofappellate-counsel claim. Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96, ^J48 (appellate counsel is
ineffective only when they overlook an obvious claim that probably would have succeeded).
Any challenges to trial counsel's investigation and use of documents and witnesses was not
obvious from the record. The letter to trial counsel identifying witnesses, the CASA logs, and
the CPS reports were not in the record. Trial counsel's investigation of the witnesses was not
12

Cramer's letter makes clear that he had conflicts with Vraybil. It indicated that
Diana Warner reported to Cramer that she believed there were accuracy problems in the
information about Cramer in the child abuse registry, but does not identify what those were.
It identified Amy Shaffer and Lori Ferrall, indicating that they were M.L.'s UNI therapists,
and that they would have noticed if M.L. exhibited any negative behavior. However, it
acknowledged that, in July 1997, Ms. Ferrall offered to write a positive letter about the
relationship between Cramer and M.L., but by September she refused to talk to him. (R. 6162.) Cramer has not offered any proof of what Amy Shaffer would have testified to had trial
counsel called her as a witness.
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in the record. Other than the subpoenas, trial counsel's investigation of the documents was not
in the record. Cramer produced no evidence in the post-conviction hearing that he informed
his appellate counsel about these issues. Thus, Cramer never proved that appellate counsel
overlooked an obvious claim. By itself, that failure defeats his post-conviction claim that they
were ineffective.
In addition, Cramer failed to prove that his appellate counsel overlooked an ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel claim that probably would have succeeded.

As demonstrated,

appellate counsel would have had to prove both deficient performance and prejudice. As to the
deficient performance, appellate counsel would have had to overcome the strong presumption
of constitutionally acceptable representation. See Point II. Appellate counsel could not have
challenged trial counsel's decisions made after thorough investigation. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
Cramer appears to support his claim, in part, by misstating trial counsel's duty and his
burden of proof. Cramer argues that a lawyer cannot make a strategic decision until she has
made a "complete" investigation. Appellant's Brief at 40. The Sixth Amendment does not
require "complete" investigation in the sense that counsel had a duty to chase down every
potential lead. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003) (the Sixth Amendment does not
require counsel "to investigate every conceivable line of... evidence no matter how unlikely the
effort would be to assist" the defendant).13
13

Cramer also argues that c"a decision not to investigate cannot be considered a
tactical decision.'" Appellant's Brief at 40 (quoting State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah
1990)). He continues that a decision not to investigate is not afforded the same deference as
a tactical decision. Id (quoting State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1255 (Utah 1993)). Cramer
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Similarly, Cramer, citing'Rompillav. Beard, 125 S. Ct 2456 (2005), suggests that counsel
could have demonstrated deficient performance merely by proving that there was '"room for
debate5" about whether trial counsel "should have done better in investigating the information"
Cramer gave them. Id at 48. Rompilla does not stand for the proposition that proving '"room
for debate5" is sufficient to establish deficient performance. Rompilla's counsel conducted a
very limited penalty phase investigation based on the directions Rompilla and his family gave
her. The United States Supreme Court commented in passing that there was "room for debate"
about whether counsel should have followed some additional lines of inquiry. Rompilla v. Beard,
\2S S. Ct. at 2463. However, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standards for proving deficient
performance established in Strickland, including the requirement that the Court review counsel's
investigation with a '"heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.'" Id. at 2462 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 689, 691 (1984)).14

leaves the misleading impression that trial counsel's decision not to pursue a specific line of
investigation is not afforded deference.
However, Tyler clarifies that it is a decision to do no investigation at all that is not
afforded deference. State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1255. Both Tyler and Templin rely on Strickland
v. Washington, which adopted the deferential standard in a case where counsel cut his
investigation short. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 672, 689-91. Thus, a decision not to
pursue a specific line of investigation is afforded deference.
14

Cramer also claims that the Supreme Court held that Rompilla's counsel's efforts to
interview Rompilla's family and mental health experts was not an adequate investigation.
Appellant's Brief at 41. Cramer misstates the holding to the extent that he suggests that
counsel, in general, may not rely on information provided by their client and the client's
family. The Supreme Court held only that Rompilla's counsel provided inadequate
representation because they failed to review Rompilla's prior conviction file even though she
knew that the Commonwealth would rely on his prior convictions in support of its request
for a death sentence. Id. at 2464-65. Had counsel done this constitutionally required
investigation, they would have discovered that Rompilla and the other sources had
misinformed her about the availability of other mitigation evidence. Id. at 2464-69.
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Cramer failed to prove that appellate counsel could have established ineffectiveassistance-of-trial-counsel under the appropriate standard. Counsel thoroughly investigated the
witnesses Cramer identified. Counsel believed that she asked the investigator to contact all of
the witnesses Cramer identified. The investigator contacted all of those witnesses and reported
back to counsel. Based on the information that counsel's thorough investigation generated, trial
counsel concluded that the witnesses would not help Cramer's case. At the post-conviction
hearing, she recalled that at least two were hostile. The character witnesses Cramer identified
would have opened the door to the jury hearing that Cramer pleaded guilty to lewdness with two
other boys under circumstances similar to those M.L. described.

Because trial counsel

thoroughly investigated the witnesses Cramer identified, appellate counsel could not have
succeeded on a challenge to her strategic decision not to call them. Strickland v. Washington^ 466
U.S. at 690.
Cramer's arguments in this appeal do not establish the contrary. Cramer does not
acknowledge the correct standard. To the contrary, he asserts that his trial counsel failed "to
follow through on leads provided by the accused." Appellant's Brief 141-42. As demonstrated,
the record does not support that assertion.
Cramer also argues that some of the potential witnesses would have described CASA and
DCFS procedures and whether specific CASA entries described regular or irregular procedures.
He also argues that some of the potential witnesses knew M.L. and "could have been used to
challenge M.L.'s credibility." Appellant's Brief at 46.
However, Cramer developed no evidence to support the conclusions he propounds on
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appeal. He called none of these witnesses in the post-conviction proceedings that he claims
could have offered this evidence. He failed to prove what CASA and DCFS procedures the
witnesses could have described or how they would have helped undermine M.L.'s testimony that
Cramer molested him on their swimming excursions.15 Similarly, he offered no proof that those
witnesses would have undermined M.L.'s credibility. As stated, trial counsel recalled that at least
two of them were hostile to the defense. Even Cramer's letter to his counsel demonstrates that
one who initially offered support later refused to return his telephone calls (R. 61). Cramer
failed to prove his claim. See, e.g. State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (1997) (Taylor failed to
demonstrate prejudice concerning mental health mitigation investigation when he produced
none of the mental health evidence that he claimed that his trial counsel could have discovered),
cert denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998).
Cramer also argues that appellate counsel should have relied on Templin to support a
challenge to trial counsel's witness investigation. Templin does not control. First, Templin's
counsel did not contact the witnesses he asked him to contact, including the witness that the
supreme court considered critical to Templin's defense. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d at 187-89. As
demonstrated, Cramer's counsel thoroughly investigated the witnesses Cramer identified and
15

Cramer testified that DCFS procedures required an investigation and determination
whether an abuse allegation was substantiated or unsubstantiated. According to Cramer, this
will either bolster the accusation or create reasonable doubt. (R. 547 at 15.)
However, Cramer's own proffered evidence demonstrated that M.L.'s accusation was
classified as substantiated. (R. 58, 65.) An administrative hearing resulted in changing that
determination to "unsubstantiated," but only because DCFS was unprepared to proceed at
the administrative hearing based on the belief that the case had been closed (R. 65-66).
(DCFS's belief was understandable, given that the hearing occurred over three years after
Cramer was convicted (R. 65 and 646.) Cramer never proved that any DCFS investigation
resulted in finding that M.L.'s accusation was unsubstantiated based on the facts discovered.
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made a strategic decision not to call them. That distinction alone would have defeated appellate
counsel's reliance on Templin.
In addition, Templin would not have supported a prejudice argument. In that rape case,
both Templin and the victim agreed that they had sex; they disputed only whether the victim
consented. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d at 184. Templin provided his counsel with names of
witnesses who would have testified to the amount of consensual physical contact between him
and the victim prior to the alleged rape. The most important witness saw Templin and the
victim kissing passionately for approximately fifteen minutes before they went to the back of the
home where they had sex. Id. at 188-89.
Consent was not an issue in Cramer's prosecution: seven-year-old M.L. could not consent
to Cramer touching him sexually. Cramer identified no witnesses for his trial counsel who could
have testified about what occurred at the swimming pools where M.L. testified Cramer molested
him. Even evidence that Cramer and M.L. appeared to get along on other occasions would not
have rebutted M.L.'s testimony that Cramer sexually abused him at the pools.
Cramer's claim that appellate counsel should have challenged trial counsel's investigation
into and use of the CASA logs and CPS report is similarly meritless. Trial counsel thoroughly
investigated the CASA logs. She subpoenaed them and reviewed them, then made a strategic
decision not to use them. Her thorough investigation made her decision not to use them
unchallengeable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. That alone would have defeated
appellate counsel's challenge to trial counsel's representation.
In addition, Cramer provides no meaningful analysis about how appellate counsel could
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have proven prejudice from trial counsel's decision to omit the CASA logs. He states that trial
counsel could have used the logs to "damage[]" M.L.'s credibility, although he acknowledges that
not all the information in the logs was "fully exculpatory." Appellant's Brief at 47. However,
Cramer points to no specific evidence in the logs that would have damaged M.L.'s credibility.
To the contrary, he merely concludes without analysis that the logs would have achieved this
end. His appellate claim fails on that basis alone. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring the parties
to support their arguments with analysis and legal authority). See State v. Honie, 57 P.2d 977,2002
UT 4 ^{61 n.7 (declining to adopt a state constitutional rule where Honie had not demonstrated
in "any meaningful way" why the Court should apply cited constitutional provisions to create
the proposed rule), cert denied^ 537 U.S. 863.16
Trial counsel testified in post-conviction that she could not remember the CPS format,
but that she knew the information in the CPS report (R. IX)}1 Cramer identifies nothing in the
CPS reports that provided impeachment so materially different from that which the jury heard
that it raised a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome.
Finally, Cramer folds into his prejudice argument about the documents and witnesses the
need for his testimony and argument that the jury would have heard "two equally plausible
stories." As demonstrated in point II, that prejudice argument fails.

16

If Cramer intends to argue that the CASA log entries about the swimming trips
would have damaged M.L.'s credibility because they contained no suggestion that Cramer
molested M.L. on those trips, the claim is frivolous. Cramer prepared the logs; the fact that
Cramer did not report that he molested M.L. would not have made M.L.'s testimony less
credible.
17

However, she also testified that she thought the CPS report was attached to
Detective Huggard's police report.
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POINT V
PRESENTING T H E CASE CRAMER ARGUES HIS COUNSEL
SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED WOULD HAVE ASSURED HIS
CONVICTION
Cramer argues that, even if counsel's alleged errors were individually harmless, they
cumulatively undermine confidence in the outcome of his case. Appellant's Brief at 48-49. With
the exception of failing to supplement the appellate record, Cramer identified no deficient
performance.18 By itself, that failure defeats his cumulative ineffective assistance claim.19
In any event, Cramer did not prove cumulative prejudice. To the contrary, the case he
claims his counsel should have presented, and that he supported with evidence at the postconviction proceeding, would have assured his conviction. The jury would have heard 1) the
inconsistencies in M.L.'s reports about Cramer molesting him; 2) witnesses testifying to Cramer's
general good character; 3) witnesses testifying to Cramer's involvement in child-oriented
community activities; 4) Cramer's explanations that he spent an extraordinary amount of time
with MX. in order to prepare him for adoption; 5) the State emphasis that Cramer reported
tickling M.L., cuddling with him, discussing with him the anatomical differences between boys
and girls during one of their swimming trips, and sitting M.L. on Cramer's lap to play the flute;
6) that DCFS classified M.L.'s abuse accusation as "substantiated"; 7) no testimony from Cramer
denying M.L.'s accusations; and 8) that Cramer pleaded guilty to two counts of lewdness with

18

The State conceded below that failing to supplement the record amounted to
constitutionally deficient representation (R. 225).
19

As to appellate counsel failure to supplement the record, Cramer failed to prove
prejudice because he failed to produce the records during the post-conviction proceedings.
See Point III.
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two other young boys for conduct at a swimming pool. In short, rather than hearing only M.L.'s
uncorroborated accusations with the inconsistencies in his accounts highlighted, the jury would
have heard no denial to M.L.'s accusations and evidence that Cramer pleaded guilty to
inappropriately touching litde boys under circumstances similar to those M.L. described. If the
jury convicted on the case it heard, the jury certainly would have convicted on the case Cramer
now says he wanted it to hear.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued, the post-conviction court correcdy denied relief. The Court
should affirm that decision.
DATED March 8, 2006.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

THOMAS BRUNKER

rr^^

Assistant Attorneys General
Appellee's counsel
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Addenda

Addendum A

§ 78-35a-105.

Burden of proof

The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of
the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section
78-35a-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996.

§ 78—35a—106.

Preclusion of relief—Exception

(1) A" person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground
that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal,
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996.

Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ALBERT CRAMER,
Petitioner,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

CASE NO.

020908139

:

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent.

:

This matter is before the Court on petitioner's claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on appeal a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Specifically,

petitioner claims that appellate counsel should have argued that
trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to obtain records of
Det. Huggard, Kyle Cook and Linda Vraybill and using the records to
impeach the victim's testimony; (2) failing to investigate and call
various

additional

petitioner's

CASA

defense
(Court

witnesses;

Appointed

(3)

Special

impeach the victim's testimony; and

failing
Advocate)

to
logs

use
to

(4) denying petitioner his

right to testify.
Post-conviction writs may be used to attack a judgment or
conviction

only

on

the

grounds

that

an obvious

injustice

or

substantial denial of a constitutional right occurred at trial.
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989) (citations
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omitted) . A petitioner may not raise an issue by means of a postconviction writ

that should have been raised on appeal.

(Citations omitted.)

Id.

However, a petitioner may raise the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time under Utah's
Post-Conviction Relief Act, Utah Code Ann., Section 78-35a-101, et
seq. (1953 as amended), if he was represented by the same counsel
at both the trial and on appeal.
(Utah 2 002) .

Rudolph v. Galetka, 43 P.3d 4 67

"When trial counsel represents

[a] defendant on

appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because it
is unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of her
own ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal."
(citations omitted.)

Id. at 468-469

In all other cases failure to raise that

issue on direct appeal results in a waiver of that claim.

Pasgual

v. Carver, 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994); Utah Code Ann., Section
78-35a-104 (1) (d) and 106(1) (4) . Such is the case here.

Petitioner

was represented by Gregory Skordas and Stephanie Ames on appeal,
and Kimberly Clark and John D. O'Connell, Jr., at trial. The issue
of ineffective assistance of counsel should have been raised on
appeal.
Relying on State v. Archambeau, 820 P. 2d 920 (Utah App. 1991),
petitioner

argues that

in certain

"exceptional

circumstances,"

specifically because his claim involves a "liberty interest," this
Court can address a claim such as his for the first time through a
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In Archambeau, defendant

argued that

a

threat to his "liberty interest" alone was sufficient to raise a
constitutional
rejected

his

issue for the first time on appeal.
reasoning,

noting

that

because

The Court

virtually

every

criminal appeal involves a "liberty interest," to adopt a per se
"liberty interest" exception "would effectively swallow the general
rule in criminal appeals."

.Id. at 925.

The court concluded that

a "liberty interest'1 claim was merely one factor to be considered
in

its

determination

circumstances."

of

Although

the

somewhat

presence

of

"exceptional

helpful, Archambeau

directly applicable to the instant case.

is not

There, defendant's case

was on direct appeal; here petitioner has filed a post-conviction
(and post-appeal) writ.
The Utah Supreme Court has given clear direction regarding
circumstances when an issue may be raised
through a post-conviction writ.
633

for the first

time

In Carter v. Galetka, 44 P. 3d 626,

(Utah 2001), the court reiterated its standard that "if the

contention of error is something which is known or should be known
to the party at the time the judgment was entered, it must be
reviewed in the...regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment
becomes final and is not subject to further attack, except in
unusual circumstances."

(Emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Turner,

440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968)).

"To demonstrate unusual circumstances,
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a petitioner must show that there was

an obvious injustice or a

substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right....'"
(Quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1035 (Utah 1989).)
None
assistance

of

petitioner's

first

three

of counsel, that counsel

claims

failed

of

ineffective

to obtain records,

failed to investigate and call additional witnesses and failed to
use

CASA

logs

circumstances"

for

impeachment

warranting

do

initial

not

constitute

review

in

"unusual

this

Petition.

Petitioner argues that his final claim, that trial counsel failed
to apprise petitioner of his constitutional
constitutes

a

"denial"

of

this

right

constitutional

"irreversibly tainted" the trial justifying reversal.

to testify,
right

He has not

claimed that the government interfered with that right.
by

the

State,

courts

have

been

reluctant

to

that

As noted

characterize

an

attorney's alleged failure to advise a defendant of his right to
testify as a constitutional defect, preferring to characterize the
issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel subject to a
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), analysis.

See,

e.g., United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1992) . This
Court agrees.

The issue ordinarily should have been raised on

appeal under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
At an evidentiary hearing on this matter, petitioner and two
trial defense attorneys testified on the issue of petitioners not
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testifying at trial.

Petitioner stated that he was told by one

attorney that she would "step on his neck" if he chose to testify
(apparently constituting advice not to testify), and did not inform
him he had a constitutional right to do so.

Ms. Clark testified

that she advised petitioner not to testify, explaining to him that
his prior conviction of lewdness involving another young boy would
come in and be very prejudicial.

She did not recall petitioner

ever saying he wanted to testify and denied threatening him with
physical violence. Mr. O'Connell recalled advising petitioner not
to testify, did not remember whether petitioner wanted to testify
and could not remember whether or not petitioner was told he had
that constitutional right.

This Court finds that petitioner's

testimony concerning his attorneys1 threats are not credible, that
assertion alone raising an issue of the credibility of the rest of
his

testimony.

testimonies

Looking

at Ms. Clark's and Mr. O'Connell's

as a whole, the Court

finds that

the

issue of

petitioner testifying at trial was thoroughly covered by counsel.
Accordingly,
constituting

this

Court

either

finds

no

"prejudicial

"unusual
denial

circumstances,"
of

petitioner's

constitutional right," or "obvious injustice" warranting postconviction relief.

Therefore, petitioner is procedurally barred
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from raising the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
through a post-conviction writ and denies his Petition.
Dated this /<f" day of July,

•Sift
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